Theologically Unfashionable Philosophy by Stump, Eleonore & Kretzmann, Norman
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 7 Issue 3 Article 6 
7-1-1990 
Theologically Unfashionable Philosophy 
Eleonore Stump 
Norman Kretzmann 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Stump, Eleonore and Kretzmann, Norman (1990) "Theologically Unfashionable Philosophy," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 7 : Iss. 3 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol7/iss3/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
THEOLOGICALLY UNFASHIONABLE 
PHILOSOPHY 
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann 
Introduction 
Gordon Kaufman has recently taken an "opportunity, as a theologian, to sug-
gest some reasons why the current philosophical discussions of 'evidentialism' 
may not capture much interest among many contemporary theologians."1 Many 
of us on the philosophical side of the line have noticed that theologians 
generally have not been interested in contemporary philosophy of religion.2 
The fact that a prominent theologian has taken the trouble to tell us why 
provides an occasion for examining and perhaps mitigating some of the 
misunderstandings that now alienate theologians from philosophers.3 
In this article of his, "Evidentialism: A Theologian's Response," Kaufman 
introduces a notion of "soft," "weak," or "quasi-" evidentialism which he 
applies in his introductory sketch of Judaism and Christianity, arguing that "it 
has characterized these faiths throughout their long histories" (p. 36). 
Kaufman's quasi-evidentialism, it should be noted, is much broader than any-
thing currently at issue in philosophers' discussions of evidentialism.4 He 
presents it as simply "the presupposition that there are clear evidences in 
human experience and history of God's activity and nature" (p. 37). The 
presupposition Kaufman identifies as quasi-evidentialism can be recognized 
as one shared by most anti-evidentialists as well as evidentialists among phi-
losophers of religion, by atheists as well as theists, as long as it is expressed 
conditionally: if there is a God, there will be clear evidences in human expe-
rience and history of his activity and nature. The fact that Kaufman discovers 
in his quasi-evidentialism the root of the problem of evil (p. 37), the most 
important objection to theism, is another indication of the pervasiveness of 
"quasi-evidentialism" in theism, atheism, and philosophy of religion generally. 
It cannot be considered an ideologically or historically distinctive position. 
It is not surprising, then, that the real object of Kaufman's concern turns 
out not to be any philosophical position but, as he sometimes says, "the 
current philosophical discussions"s over the issue of evidentialism. And what 
has killed the theologians' interest in the philosophers' discussions (of 
evidentialism and most other issues in philosophy of religion) is the fact that 
they "seem to presuppose essentially traditional theistic conceptions and 
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implies that the responsibility for this breakdown in communication lies with 
the philosophers. For although the theologians know what the philosophers 
are up to-continuing "to inquire into 'evidence' which bear on this or that 
detail of traditional beliefs" (p. 42)-the philosophers' preoccupation with 
traditional conceptions and formulations has prevented them from "informing 
themselves about, and engaging themselves with, major questions which con-
temporary theologians find central" (p. 35). 
In theory the dialogue could be resumed if the theologians were to return 
to the traditional territory of theology they abandoned before the philosophers 
recently occupied it. But in Kaufman's view that way to reconciliation ap-
pears blocked by "an issue to which contemporary theologians have increas-
ingly felt they must address themselves, namely, the problematic character 
of certain basic presuppositions of this tradition itself" (p. 36). The philoso-
phers have largely missed seeing the largescale, systemic flaws in traditional 
Christian theology because "the questions considered in the [philosophers'] 
evidentialist debates are internal to the tradition" (p. 39). With the aim of 
alerting philosophers to these flaws, a first step in reestablishing communi-
cation, Kaufman introduces three of the considerations that have led theolo-
gians to abandon the theological tradition in which (or at least on which) 
many philosophers of religion are now working. 
Religious pluralism 
Kaufman feels that philosophers doing traditional philosophical work on 
traditional theological doctrines are likely to have missed "the rise of a new 
consciousness of the significance of religious pluralism" (p. 39), the first of 
these crucial considerations. Any doctrinal tradition is anti-pluralistic in its 
natural presupposition that the claims internal to it are true and that claims 
outside of and incompatible with it are false. And contemporary, traditional 
philosophers of religion are naturally inclined to take that presupposition 
seriously, whether they support or oppose the doctrinal claims. Acknowledg-
ing that even such tradition-bound philosophical thinking about religious 
issues exhibits "awareness of the plurality of religious traditions and 
claims,8" Kaufman points out that contemporary theologians "now see the 
plurality among religious traditions, as well as the enormous pluralism within 
the Christian tradition, as themselves of profound human meaning and im-
portance: what seems required now, therefore, is careful and appreciative 
study, together with an attitude of openness."9 
One value of this comparative study characterized by openness is that 
in learning about other religions one becomes better able to understand 
one's own, as Kaufman points out.10 But, of course, learning about other 
religions is perfectly compatible with and sometimes even conducive to 
continuing to take the distinctive doctrines of one religion to be true (or 
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false), and so this advantage of pluralism is available even to those who work 
in the philosophically traditional way on the traditional doctrines of a single 
religion. 
But the value of pluralism that has most theoretical importance for Kaufman 
really is incompatible with truth-claims in behalf of anyone religion. The "new 
consciousness of the significance of religious pluralism" contributes to the 
theologians' loss of interest in "the strictly 'philosophical' inquiry into the 
'truth-claims' being made within the tradition" (p. 39), to "a profound ques-
tioning of the propriety of making dogmatic claims of any sort with regard 
to ... [the] ultimate 'reality' or 'truth'" of "religious and philosophical tradi-
tions" (p. 42). The crucial significance of religious pluralism from his point 
of view, then, is that it contributes to the religious agnosticism he is funda-
mentally advocating in this paper as a replacement for "the traditional attempts 
to make definitive normative claims about 'Christian truth'" (p. 40).11 
Religious pluralism has practical as well as theoretical significance in 
Kaufman's view of it. Its "openness" is supposed to entail more sympathy 
with or respect for various (particularly non-Christian) "overarching religious 
worldviews" (p. 39), as is especially clear in his advocacy of "a deep humility 
about the religious and philosophical traditions we have inherited" (p. 42) 
and in his characterization of the traditional, cognitivist attitude toward doc-
trinal claims as having a "polemical intent," as concerned with bringing out 
an opposed religion's "diabolical nature" (p. 40), a characterization he asso-
ciates with Christianity specifically. 
Is there really more sympathy for other world views in religious agnosticism 
than there is in traditional Christianity, his chosen paradigm of the opposition 
to religious agnosticism? Arrogant, intolerant attitudes on the part of individ-
ual Christians are not at issue here. There are, obviously, also arrogant and 
intolerant adherents to agnosticism (as well as to atheism, Buddhism, Marx-
ism, capitalism, etc.). No one worldview has managed to attract all the 
world's arrogant and intolerant people. In deciding which position is more 
sympathetic and respectful, then, the only relevant comparison must be be-
tween attitudes entailed by religious agnosticism and those entailed by the 
doctrinal propositions of traditional Christianity. 
Kaufman doesn't spell out how in his view traditional Christianity might 
entail lack of sympathy and respect toward other religions. But his rhetoric, 
as displayed in passages already quoted and, e.g., in his reference to "so-
called 'religious truth-claims'" (p. 40), suggests that he takes the deplorable 
attitude to stem from the mere fact that traditional Christian theologians (or 
philosophers) take the propositions of Christian doctrine to be trueY If the 
claims of Christianity are true, then, of course, any claims incompatible with 
them are false. On this basis Christians are committed to judging that many 
or most claims of other religions are false. And, Kaufman seems to think, to 
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judge that the claims of other religions are false is to show oneself lacking 
in sympathy and respect for those religions. 
But, of course, rejecting some propositions as false is just an essential 
aspect of any search for truth. Such negative judgments need not be, and in 
the best traditions of Christian philosophical theology have not been, "po-
lemical pronouncements" (p. 40) associated with dark motives of any kind. 
If religious propositions admit of truth and falsity at all, as the tradition 
maintains they do, a judgment that some religious proposition is false no more 
entails lack of sympathy and respect than does a correction of another 
person's mistake. 
But is Kaufman's religious agnosticism itself in any way less committed 
to making such judgments than traditional Christianity is? Does his position 
entail rejecting fewer beliefs of other religions than Christianity does? No; 
quite the contrary. According to religious agnosticism, no one knows any-
thing about the nature and activity of the deity. But then Kaufman's position 
must reject as false all claims made by Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and other 
religions to know things of that sort. Christianity, on the other hand, can and 
traditionally does accept a significant number of the claims made by other 
religions-that there is a personal deity, for example, or that there are occa-
sions of divine intervention in human affairs. When Aquinas acknowledges 
that not just Jews and Saracens but even pagans share some religious beliefs 
with Christians, he typifies this aspect of the tradition. 13 Religious agnosti-
cism, however, must reject even all such widely shared religious claims as 
false, because they are or are embedded in claims to know something about 
God, and on Kaufman's view any such claim is false. If lack of sympathy 
and disrespect are inevitable concomitants of the rejection of religious claims, 
as Kaufman seems to think, then his position is not more sympathetic and 
respectful than traditional Christianity with regard to other religions, but less. 
This aspect of religious agnosticism might help to explain the peculiar fact 
that in a short essay extolling openness, Kaufman repeatedly takes a superior, 
dismissive attitude towards adherents of major world religions, characterizing 
ancient Hebrew views of God, for example, as "crude" and describing the 
beliefs of the authors of Deuteronomy as "simplistic" (p. 36). And he does 
not stop with attributing intellectual defects to adherents of other traditions. 
Kaufman's position not only implies that the adherents of major world reli-
gions are mistaken or self-deceived but explicitly holds that they are sinful: 
"If we try to overcome and control the mystery within which we live-for 
example, ... through religious rituals or practices which promise us a secure 
place in the ultimate scheme of things-we sin against God, as we try to make 
ourselves the ultimate disposers of our lives and destiny. We must, then, 
repent" (p. 44). And the form of repentance enjoined by Kaufman is the 
adoption of religious agnosticism. Since he attributes moral as well as intel-
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lectual defects to the adherents of all traditional religions, prescribing his 
own position as the only antidote, it is hard to see any way in which 
Kaufman's position is more open, more sympathetic or more respectful, to-
ward other religions than is traditional Christianity (or Judaism or Islam). 
It seems important to say one further word about the assumption on which 
this part of Kaufman's argument rests. Sympathy and respect are attitudes 
that are shown primarily toward persons, and only in a derivative sense 
toward systems of belief. To have sympathy seems fundamentally to be a 
matter of sharing the feelings of some person. To say that one is in sympathy 
with Marxism, for example, is to say that one is inclined to feel about things 
as committed Marxists do feel. But on this basis lack of sympathy and dis-
respect for the adherents of a position are clearly not inevitable concomitants 
of rejecting the position. Reading here and there in Foxe's Book of Martyrs 
will make the point vividly. Most of us do not hold or would even repudiate 
the beliefs for which some of those people died the horrible deaths described 
there, but hardly anyone can read those descriptions of noble, patient endur-
ance of suffering without feeling sympathy and respect for those men and 
women. So it strikes us as a mistake to associate sympathy and respect with 
sharing or even with refraining from repudiating beliefs, as Kaufman seems 
to do. In fact, tying our sympathy and respect for persons to the worldviews 
they hold seems precisely the sort of mistake which has done most to provoke 
the religious hatreds proponents of openness, like most other people, want 
very much to avoid. 
Christian evil 
A second crucial consideration "driving contemporary theologians into 
major reassessments of traditional assumptions about the Christian tradition" 
(p. 41) is their "sensitivity to Christian responsibility for certain aspects of 
the massive evils which confront us today" (p. 42).14Jt is, Kaufman maintains, 
"Christian faith, Christian ways of understanding the world and the human 
place within the world ... " which bear "some significant responsibility" for 
"two horrible world wars, the Nazi holocaust and other instances of genocide, 
the ecological crisis, the use of atomic bombs in World War II and the 
ever-present possibility of nuclear obliteration of the human race, and so on" 
(pp. 41-42). Asking themselves "How could Christian practices, attitudes and 
ideas have led to these horrors?," Christian theologians "have begun to turn 
with new interest to see what other religious (and humanistic) traditions have 
to offer" (p. 42). In this way the vision of Christian evil helps to motivate 
the religious pluralism that is to alleviate it. 
As we have seen, Kaufman's advocacy of religious pluralism includes an 
imputation of intolerance to Christianity, which we have already rejected, in 
part because it involved a confusion between the religion and some of its 
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adherents. That same confusion vitiates this consideration. Even if for 
argument's sake we supposed what we do not believe-that the people who 
bear the most responsibility for all the twentieth-century evils Kaufman lists 
would have claimed to be Christians-the supposition would obviously not 
imply that their religion itself led to those evils. The people responsible for 
the worst moral evils of our century or any other may, of course, be adherents 
of absolutely any worldview, even of one that forbids the evil in question, 
even of religious agnosticism. In perpetrating evil such people may, for ex-
ample, simply violate the precepts of their worldview (like those who arrogate 
to themselves the privileges of an elite while subscribing to the ideal of 
classlessness), or they may append novel precepts to their professed 
worldview in a way which distorts its character (as Madame Chiang was said 
to have distorted the Maoist worldview during the cultural revolution). 
In order to show that Christianity, rather than certain individual adherents 
to some version of it, bears significant responsibility for the most flagrant 
evils of our century, Kaufman would have to overcome a formidable array 
of obstacles. To begin with, he would have to hold, contrary to what he 
professes in advocating religious pluralism, that there is a single system of 
beliefs which counts as Christian, distinct from the distortions added by 
individual Christians (such as those foisted upon Christianity by the New 
England Puritans who thought that it entailed a prohibition against kissing 
one's wife on Sunday, or by those followers of Cromwell who supposed the 
Bible proved that England was the New Jerusalem). And then he would have 
to show that this single system of beliefs entails the rightness of moral 
precepts that enjoin or at least warrant world wars, genocide, ecological 
irresponsibility, and the like. If there is nothing which can count as the 
Christian system of beliefs, or if the Christian system of beliefs doesn't entail 
the rightness of such precepts, then it can't be the case that Christianity itself, 
as distinct from some of its adherents, is responsible for such evils. We see 
no sign that Kaufman is even aware of the need for overcoming these obsta-
cles, and we are skeptical about the possibility of anyone's producing a sound 
argument that would achieve that result. 
Cultural relativism 
The last of Kaufman's three considerations that have led theologians away 
from contemporary philosophy of religion is "the growing awareness of the 
way in which all our ideas are shaped by the cultural and symbolic framework 
of orientation within which we are living and thinking" (p. 42),1S Cultural 
relativism of the sort Kaufman bases on this observation has, of course, 
played a role in ethics for a long time, but Kaufman is prepared to use it 
epistemologically, as what seems to be the principal support of his religious 
agnosticism. In the light of this relativism, he thinks, "it does not seem 
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appropriate to move directly to questions about, for example, the "evidences' 
which can (or cannot) be brought forward for certain (usually quite tradi-
tional) beliefs about God" (p. 41). Some of what he proclaims as novel in 
this connection has been part of the background of philosophical theology as 
long as it has been practiced-e.g., "It is not possible responsibly to discuss 
questions about "evidences' respecting God-i.e., the reality, and not simply 
what is all too easily assumed to be "the traditional notion' of God-without 
first addressing in some detail these questions about what we are seeking 
evidences for" (p. 41). 
The radical side of this consideration emerges only when he insists that we 
must renounce "our claims to certainty of knowledge" (p. 44), that "we cannot 
find definitive answers" to such questions as "Are some religious or philo-
sophical or moral or scientific traditions of more value than others in address-
ing such matters [e.g., "What is a truly "good' life, and how would one 
possibly know?"], or are all in various ways both helpful and misleading, 
leaving us in a problematic relativism?" (p. 43). On this view, our arguing, 
our thinking, even our experiencing, cannot lay claim to objectivity. They 
are all functions of the particular world view in which our lives are acciden-
tally embedded, and whether we are rational in accepting that worldview, or 
whether it is correct, are open questions we cannot answer. 
But, of course, if all our arguing, thinking, and experiencing are functions 
of a necessarily unfounded worldview, then presumably Kaufman's agnostic 
pluralism is also a function of an unfounded worldview, of one perhaps 
identifiable as the sophisticated relativism and skepticism familiar to anyone 
who has been living an academic life in America in recent decades. And if 
Kaufman's views themselves are just a function of an unfounded worldview, 
then in telling us that "philosophical or theological ideas in which we take 
ourselves to be in a position to present conclusive evidences and arguments" 
are symptoms of sin (p. 44), he is fundamentally only revealing the cultural 
and symbolic framework that shapes his ideas. How is this biographical 
information about a particular theologian (or even about all contemporary 
American theologians) supposed to constitute an argument against traditional 
Christianity (or Judaism or Islam)? If Kaufman is simply expressing what his 
cultural framework has shaped him to think, there is no reason for anyone 
who feels the slightest uneasiness about these views to accept them. After 
all, not everyone-not even everyone in contemporary academic America-
will share Kaufman's cultural framework. 
On the other hand, if Kaufman's arguments and reasons have any claim to 
objectivity, as his earnest recommendation of openness suggests he supposes, 
then presumably it is false that all our thinking and experiencing are only 
functions of our cultural framework. And if that skeptical claim is false, then 
it seems reasonable enough to suppose that Kaufman's position is not the 
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only one that can lay claim to objectivity, that some religious worldviews 
might also rightfully do so. 
Kaufman's morality and theology 
Although Kaufman pleads for religious agnosticism and embraces episte-
mological (as well as ethical) relativism, at least as regards the big questions, 
he shows throughout the article, perhaps inadvertently, that there are certain 
moral and religious claims that he holds as true and apparently supposes he 
knows. Here are just a few such claims, which he puts forward with no sign 
of agnosticism or skepticism: 
(1) the Holocaust, the first and second world wars, and our treatment of the 
environment are all major evils (p. 41); 
(2) ~God is beyond our understanding and knowledge" (p. 43); 
(3) "we dare not claim" that any of the ways in which we conceive of God 
"have been directly revealed by God" (p. 44); 
(4) to "try to make ourselves the ultimate disposers of our lives and destiny" 
is to "sin against God" (p. 44); 
(5) God may be described as "that ultimate mystery in which both our being 
and our fulfillment are grounded" (p. 44). 
Consider (1), which Kaufman puts forward as unquestionably true and known 
by him to be true. (1) is a moral claim. If there is a moral claim which 
Kaufman takes to be true and known to be true, what entitles him to say (p. 
43) that we can't know whether some moral views are of more value than 
others in helping us sort out major issues? Plainly he thinks (with good 
reason) that he knows that moral views that see genocide and reckless ex-
ploitation of the environment as evil are of more value than those which see 
these things as praiseworthy or acceptable. 
It seems to us, then, that Kaufman is ambivalent or inconsistent in his 
agnosticism and skepticism, unwittingly abandoning those attitudes when he 
has a point to make. In fact, inconsistency seems built into Kaufman's posi-
tion. (2), Kaufman's basic agnostic claim, belongs to the family of proposi-
tions that cannot be known to be true. To claim that God is beyond our 
knowledge is to make a claim about God's nature, namely, that God's nature 
has the property of being unknowable by us. But if Kaufman is able to know 
one property of God's, his claim falsifies itself.16 If one of God's properties 
is knowable, namely, the property of being unknowable by us, then it can't 
be the case that God is entirely beyond our knowledge. And any known 
property, even the property of transcending our knowledge and understand-
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ing, can be shown to entail further properties-e.g., that God is not a finite 
spatio-temporal entity. 
But when he does make a positive point, Kaufman is, no doubt inadver-
tently, entering into the evidentialist discussions he deplores; for in such cases 
we can and should ask him for his evidence. For a theological example of 
this sort, consider (4), the claim that we sin against God when we try to make 
ourselves the ultimate disposers of our lives and destiny, and consider it in 
the light of (2), "God is beyond our understanding and knowledge." How can 
Kaufman know that it is not God's will that we should strive for ultimate 
independence? Not on the basis of any revelation, as (3) indicates; and cer-
tainly not on the basis of any philosophical inquiry, regarding which it is a 
sin-this very sin-to think it yields any understanding or knowledge of God. 
(The sort of thing said about (4) can also be said about (5) in the light of (2) 
and (3).) 
In repudiating philosophical theology's characteristic concern with evi-
dence, with the rationality and truth of religious beliefs, Kaufman advocates 
instead a program of preliminary questions, such as "How should God be 
conceived today?" (p. 41). But, of course, not even he can sustain this purely 
interrogatory attitude toward the subject matter of his field. And to the extent 
to which he has and employs a conception of God, he is subject, along with 
all the quasi-evidentialist philosophers of religion, to demands for evidence 
in support of his position. In these circumstances he would do better to 
abandon at least this aspect of his opposition to philosophical theology and 
share our worries about rationality and truth, entering into evidentialist dis-
cussions no longer unwittingly and inadvertently. 
Conclusion 
Kaufman deplores the lack of communication between philosophers and 
theologians; so do we. Kaufman seeks to remedy the lack by inviting the 
philosophers to come away from working at the traditional problems of the-
ology, to join the theologians in their wanderings, in their programs of pre-
liminary questions. We think the most powerful of the motives prompting 
those wanderings, those regressions to the stage of preliminary questioning, 
was the theologians' growing suspicion that the traditional doctrines could 
not be taken seriously by intelligent, sophisticated, twentieth-century aca-
demics. But now, working in the field from which the theologians have 
wandered, philosophers who do take the doctrines seriously invite the theo-
logians to return. We could use their help.17 
Eleonore Stump, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University 
Norman Kretzmann, Cornell University 
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NOTES 
1. Gordon D. Kaufman, K'Evidentialism': A Theologian's Response," Faith and Phi-
losophy 6 (1989), 35-46; p. 35. 
2. Alfred Freddoso expresses very well the philosophers' view of the rift between the 
two naturally allied disciplines: KSome contemporary theologians dismiss the classical 
discussions of the existence and nature of God as out of step with and unworthy of serious 
consideration by so-called 'modem man.' ... we find an attitude of distrust toward any sort 
of metaphysical reflection on the ostensible theological claims of the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition... In light of this it is at least mildly surprising that a growing number of 
Anglo-American philosophers, many of them highly distinguished, are finding the classi-
cal discussions of God's existence and nature to be fertile sources for critical reflection 
on issues in the philosophy of religion .... At a time when many theologians have in effect 
discarded as irrelevant large chunks of traditional philosophical theology, it may be the 
unlikely lot of contemporary philosophers to crack open once again the lonely dust-cov-
ered volumes" (The Existence and Nature of God, ed. A. J. Freddoso; Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1983; Introduction, pp. 1-2; 10). It is important to note 
that not all theologians have turned away from contemporary philosophical theology. For 
instance, two theologians, Ronald Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., recently organized 
a highly successful cooperative conference of philosophers and theologians on some of 
the most difficult of the traditional issues, the results of which have been published as 
Trinity. Incarnation. and Atonement, ed. Feenstra and Plantinga; Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1989. 
3. Kaufman naturally claims to be speaking only for himself among theologians; but 
he also says, quite plausibly, that his position is not Kcompletely idiosyncratic" (p. 35). 
Without forgetting his disclaimer, we find it convenient to write as if Kaufman's position 
could simply be taken to be the position of contemporary theologians generally. 
4. See, e.g., Alvin Plantinga, KCoherentism and the Evidentialist Objection to Belief in 
God," in Rationality. Religious Belief and Moral Commitment, ed. R. Audi and W. J. 
Wainwright (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 109-38; Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, KOnce More Evidentialism-This Time, Social," Philosophical Topics 16 
(1988), pp. 53-74; Stephen J. Wykstra, KToward a Sensible Evidentialism: On the Notion 
of 'Needing Evidence,''' in Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, 2nd edn., ed. W. 
L. Rowe and W. 1. Wainwright (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, 1989), pp. 426-37; 
Norman Kretzmann, KEvidence Against Anti-Evidentialism" in a forthcoming volume 
edited by Kelly Clark. 
5. p. 35; emphasis added; cf. the article's abstract, with its reference to Krecent discussion 
of 'evidentialism'''; also p. 36. 
6. P. 35; emphasis added; cf. p. 36: Kthese discussions continue to take for granted 
assumptions which are today in question for a good many theologians." 
7. Although Kaufman offers some observations about religions other than Christian-
ity-Judaism in particular-he recognizes that the theological tradition most influential 
in contemporary philosophy of religion is Christian, and he describes himself as a 
Christian theologian (p. 44). Our discussion, like his, will therefore focus on Christian 
theology. 
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8. P. 39; emphasis added. 
9. p. 40; emphasis added. 
10. Mit is expected that comparison with other symbols and practices-for example, 
those of Buddhists or Jews (or Marxists)-will illuminate dimensions of Christian faith 
and life and symbols which have remained hidden to direct internalist approaches to 
theological questions" (p. 40). 
11. On p. 44 he says of the position he advocates that it Mmust inevitably involve a 
certain agnosticism," but the religious agnosticism we ascribe to him and focus our 
discussion on permeates his article well before he acknowledges it by name. 
12. See, e.g., p. 40; also the reference on p. 41 to Ma powerful Christian sense of divine 
authorization and thus superiority over other religions." 
13. See, e.g., Summa theologiae IIaIIae q. 2, a. 8. 
14. In our discussion we are reversing the order of Kaufman's second and third 
considerations. 
15. For other versions of this consideration see pp. 35,40, and 45. 
16. Cf. Alvin Plantinga, Does God Have a Nature?, The Aquinas Lecture, 1980. 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980), pp. 13-26. 
17. We are grateful to Jeffrey Hause, Thomas V. Morris, and Alvin Plantinga for 
comments on an earlier draft. 
